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the effect is conditional on the degree of political stability. The empirical findings support the the-
ory and are robust to alternative specifications. The stringency enhancing effect on environmental
policy of trade integration is greater in politically stable countries.
KEYWORDS: Trade liberalization, environmental regulations, political instability, pollution haven,
trade policy
∗Per G. Fredriksson is at the Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Box
0496, Dallas, TX 75275-0496 (pfredrik@mail.smu.edu), and Muthukumara Mani is at the
Environment Department, The World Bank, MC 5-511, 1818 H St., NW, Washington, DC
20433 (mmani@worldbank.org). We would like to thank the helpful referees, Rimjhim Agger-
wal, Andrea Bigano, Richard Damania, Tom Fomby, Mads Greaker, Eckhard Janeba, Michael
Keen, Daniel Millimet, Muhammet Pakdil, Arvind Subramanian, Olaf Unteroberdoerster, Jim
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This paper examines how increased economic integration influences the determination 
of environmental policies in countries with unstable political regimes.   
The relationship between trade policy and environmental policy and quality is an 
unresolved issue in the scholarly and public debate. For example, Antweiler et al. 
(2001) and Dean (2002) find that trade liberalization, on the whole, is likely to improve 
environmental quality. Others argue that trade openness threatens environmental goals 
(see Esty and Geradin, 1998). The current discussion on the effects of economic 
integration on environmental policymaking has risen to the forefront of the public 
debate in part due to the well-publicized protests at recent major trade negotiation 
meetings (for example, at the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999).1  
Nonetheless, economic integration is progressing rapidly in several regions of the 
world, for example in the southern cone of Latin America (MERCOSUR), Asia 
(AFTA), North America (NAFTA), Europe (EU), and negotiations are under way for a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).  However, some fundamental questions are 
still being asked, both in developed and developing economies, on the implications of 
further economic integration. In particular, does trade liberalization affect governments’ 
ability to manage economic activity, i.e. does it limit governments’ freedom of action 
on regulatory policies such as on the environment? If this would be the case, trade 
liberalization would contribute to creating “pollution havens”. 
When analyzing the effect of trade liberalization on environmental policymaking, 
we believe it beneficial to take domestic political conditions into account. It is often 
argued that political instability has large adverse economic and social effects, especially 
in countries where the government is driven by short-term motives, supporting narrow 
interest groups, and ignoring long-term costs (see, e.g., Rodrik, 1991).  
While the effects of economic integration and political instability have been 
studied in separate strands of the literature, no attempt has been made to study the 
interaction between them (on economic integration see, for example, Fredriksson, 1999; 
Antweiler et al., 2001; and Dean, 2002; on political instability see, for example, Bohn 
and Deacon, 2000; Brett and Keen, 2000; and Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003).2 We 
                                                 
1 In the context of increasing globalization of capital flows, some observers have argued that gaps in 
national environmental standards draw the most polluting industries to developing countries, creating 
"pollution havens" and propelling a global "race to the bottom" in environmental standards (see Wilson, 
1996, for a survey). Esty and Geradin (1998, p.7) argue that: “considerable evidence suggests that 
government officials, facing the prospect of reduced sales, lost jobs and diminished investment in 
domestic industries caused by competition with foreign companies whose costs are lower due to more lax 
environmental requirements, often choose not to elevate environmental standards and sometimes even 
relax enforcement of current standards.”  
2 Antweiler et al. (2001) study the effect of trade openness on pollution levels, and show theoretically and 
empirically the scale, composition, and technique effects of trade liberalization. In their study, all 
countries will set stricter environmental policies due to real income increases following trade 
liberalization, but the total effect depends on factor endowments. On average, the pollution levels decline, 
however. Copeland (1994, 1996) investigates the welfare effects of trade and environmental policy 
reforms, Copeland and Taylor (1994, 1995) discuss the linkages between income, pollution, and trade, 
López (1997) analyzes the effect of trade liberalization on environmental resources (biomass) and 
deforestation in Ghana, Rauscher (1994), Bommer and Schulze (1999), Fredriksson (1999), and Damania 
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aim to close this gap in the literature. We seek to shed light on whether the effects of 
trade openness and political stability reinforce each other, or whether their impacts 
instead are opposed.  
Our focus is on the impact of trade liberalization on the political forces forming 
environmental policy, in particular in the presence of domestic political instability. Our 
theoretical model builds on Bernheim and Whinston’s (1986) and Grossman and 
Helpman’s (1994) common agency model, which recently has been extended to 
environmental policymaking by, for example, Damania (2001).3  In our model, a lobby 
group representing the polluting industry aims to influence the incumbent government’s 
environmental policy choice by promising a bribe (or campaign contribution) in return 
for a favorable policy decision.  The incumbent government values both the bribe and 
aggregate social welfare, and the relative weight on welfare is viewed as a useful 
measure of government corruptibility.4 We focus the discussion on relatively dishonest 
(corrupt) regimes, which put a great weight on bribes relative to social welfare.  
In a three-stage small open economy model, we analyze the effects of economic 
integration on the behavior of the incumbent government and a producer lobby group. 
In the first stage, the government receives a bribe schedule by the lobby group, which 
relates the size of the bribe to the attractiveness of the government’s environmental 
policy choice. When formulating its bribe offer, the lobby takes the probability of 
eventual policy implementation into account, i.e. the level of political stability. For 
policy implementation to occur, the incumbent government must remain in power 
throughout the (third) policy implementation stage. In the second stage, the government 
chooses its optimal environmental policy, taking into account its own turnover 
probability. It receives in return a bribe corresponding to its policy choice. In the third 
stage, the environmental policy previously selected by the government is implemented, 
given that it remains in power. The political crisis causing the departure of the 
government could take the form of, for example, a coup d’etat or a vote of no 
                                                                                                                                               
et al. (2003) study the effect of trade liberalization on environmental policymaking, the latter in the 
presence of corruption. Hillman and Ursprung (1994) study the effect of environmental lobby groups on 
trade and environmental policies. These papers ignore political stability, however. Bohn and Deacon 
(2000) study the effect of ownership security (a function of political violence and instability) on 
deforestation and oil extraction, Brett and Keen (2000) explore politicians’ incentive to earmark pollution 
tax revenues in the presence of political uncertainty, and Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) study the 
interaction between corruption and political instability on agricultural sector environmental policies. This 
literature ignores the issue of trade liberalization. Thus, no previous study exists on the joint effects of 
trade openness and political stability on environmental policymaking. 
3 While several authors in the literature use the basic structure of Grossman and Helpman’s (1994) model 
to study environmental and trade policies, the joint effects of trade integration and political instability 
have not been analyzed using this common agency model.   
4 While in some countries the transfer of funds to politicians is legal (e.g., campaign contributions from 
political action committees in the U.S.), in this paper we view all monetary gifts to the government 
corruption. Corruption here implies that the policy maker is willing to deviate from a welfare maximizing 
policy in return for monetary gifts from a lobby group. 
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confidence. If the incumbent government’s policy is not implemented, the lobby group 
does not benefit from the bribe paid in the second stage.5  
In this paper, we show that trade integration affects both the producer lobby’s and 
the government’s incentives in the policy formation process, and that these incentives 
are conditional on the degree of political stability.6  We find that trade integration in a 
polluting sector has two effects on the pollution tax.  First, as output falls, the lobby has 
less at stake and its bribery effort declines accordingly. This “bribery reduction effect” 
of trade integration causes the pollution tax to rise. Second, note that the government 
has a welfare maximizing incentive to tax excess output and pollution created by 
protection. This incentive declines as a result of trade integration, a “welfare effect”. 
When the government is sufficiently dishonest (corrupt), the bribery reduction effect 
dominates. In this case, trade integration raises the pollution tax. The model also 
predicts that the effect of trade integration is conditional on the degree of political 
stability.   
Since political instability reduces both the lobby’s incentive to seek influence, and 
the government’s incentive to deliver welfare, the changes in the intensities of these 
motives resulting from trade integration are moderated by political instability. In the 
limit when political stability is extremely low, trade integration has close to no effect on 
environmental policy, because both the bribery and welfare effects of trade integration 
are negligible. This is a novel finding in the literature, to our knowledge.  
The prediction generated by the model is evaluated using cross-country data from 
92 non-OECD and 26 OECD countries. Our empirical work supports our theory, since 
we find that trade openness is associated with more stringent environmental policy. This 
suggests that the “bribery reduction effect” dominates the “welfare effect”. We also find 
that the marginal effect of openness is conditional on the degree of political stability. In 
particular, the stringency enhancing effect of trade integration on environmental policy 
is greater in more stable countries. Our empirical results are robust to several 
alternative measures of the degree of economic integration and political stability. We 
believe they may serve to inform the policy debate of the likely effects on 
environmental policymaking of further trade integration.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 sets up the theoretical model and 
Section 2 discusses the effects of trade integration and political stability on 
environmental policy.  Section 3 presents our empirical model and data, and Section 4 




                                                 
5 In other words, bribe payments are not conditional on the policy being implemented and there is no 
legal recourse forcing the return of given bribes. Another implicit assumption is that a government 
dislodged from power will not seek reelection, and hence has no incentive to either placate the lobby or 
address welfare questions (see also Coate and Morris, 1999). 
6 Rose (2004) reports that GATT/WTO members do not appear to be more open to international trade, 
and we therefore disregard the possibility that reductions in trade barriers are reciprocal.  
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1. The Model 
 
A small open economy has two sectors. The “clean” sector produces a 
numeraire good z, and the polluting sector produces a good x.  The economy is 
populated by two types of individuals, consumers (denoted by S) and factor owners (F). 
The two population groups are of size s and f, respectively, and the population is 
normalized to 1. We assume that the factor owners are a highly concentrated group such 
that their share of the population is approximately zero, i.e. f=0 and s =1. All individuals 
have labor income, factor owners in addition have factor income from ownership of a 
sector-specific factor. The consumers derive disutility from the pollution associated 
with the local production. An individual k, k=S,F, has a utility given by7 
 
(1)   ,)( XcucU Sxkkzkk θδ−+=  
 
where czk and cxk are consumption of the numeraire good z and good x by a type k, with 
world market prices equal to 1 and pw, respectively.  The world market price pw is 
exogenously given as the country is a price taker.   u(cxk ) is a strictly concave and 
differentiable sub-utility function. Sδ  is an indicator variable which takes a value of 
one if the individual is a consumer, and zero otherwise.8 While s is defined as the share 
of consumers in the total population, it is also the marginal disutility of pollution, since 
the share s has disutility 1 and the others have disutility 0. Production of x is given by X, 
and θ is the per-unit damage function. The government regulates pollution by levying a 
pollution tax t∈ T, T⊂ℜ , on each unit of damage from polluting production activities. If 
the polluting sector is import-competing (exporting), it benefits from an ad-valorem 
import tariff (export subsidy), .τ 9 Whereas the pollution tax is set by the government 
(relatively few pollutants are covered by international agreements), the tariff is assumed 
determined entirely by multilateral trade negotiations which this small country 
government is unable to influence. All individuals thus take the tariff rate as given.10 
Let subscripts denote partial derivatives. The per-unit damage is a function of the 
amount of abatement, A, carried out per unit of output, such that ),(Aθθ =  where 
,0<Aθ  and .0>AAθ   
An individual k spending Yk consumes cxk=d(pw(1+τ))=uc-1 and czk=Yk-
pw(1+τ)d(pw(1+τ)), where d(.) is the demand function for good x.  Thus, the indirect 
                                                 
7 Corner solutions may result with quasi-linear preferences. We assume interior solutions, however. 
8 Our results would be unaltered if we assumed that factor owners also suffered disutility from pollution, 
as long as they remain in favor of a lower pollution tax.  We opt to keep the model as simple as possible. 
9 From now on we discuss only the import-competition (tariff) case, since import competing sectors 
generally receive more protection. Identical results hold in the case of an exporting sector with an export 
subsidy. Note that export taxes are illegal in some countries, for example the U.S. We therefore ignore the 
issue of export taxes, although we recognize that they are used in some developing countries. 
10 The exogeneity assumption is supported by our empirical findings, see Section 3 below.  Moreover, as 
pointed out by Ederington (2000), the success of GATT negotiations in reducing worldwide tariff barriers 
has resulted in a shift of attention to domestic policy instruments as secondary trade barriers. 
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utility function of a consumer is expressed as VS(pw,τ,YS)=YS+C(pw(1+τ))-θX, where 
C(pw(1+τ))= u[d(pw(1+τ))]-pw(1+τ)d(pw(1+τ)) is the consumer surplus derived from 
consumption of good x.  There is no consumer surplus from consumption of good z. 
Each individual has a unit of labor and the total labor endowment equals l. Good z 
is produced by labor alone with a constant returns to scale technology, and an input-
output coefficient equal to one. The labor supply is sufficiently large for the supply of 
this good to be positive which implies a wage rate equal to one. The inputs into 
production of good x are labor and a sector-specific factor.  The technology is constant 
returns to scale. Ignoring labor costs, producers of good x face a net price given 
by ,)()1( AAt-p=p w −+ θτ  and the specific factor reward depends entirely on the 
producer's net price, p, i.e. ).( pπ  The first-order condition with respect to abatement 
equals ,0)1( =+−= AA tX θπ  which in turn is used to find .0)/( >−= AAAt tA θθ  The 
supply curve for good x is given by Hotelling’s Lemma, i.e. ),()( ppX pπ=  where 
0>pX , and .0=ppX
11 Imports of the polluting good are given by 
)]())1(([)( pXpdppM ww −+= τ . Net aggregate tax and tariff revenues are given by 
 
(2)   ),()(),( pMpXt=tR τθτ +      
 
and are assumed distributed equally to all individuals as lump-sum.  
The income obtained by the owners of the sector-specific factor depends on the 
environmental policy (as well as on trade policy). Factor owners are assumed able to 
organize into a lobby group that coordinates a prospective bribe offer to the incumbent 
government.  The consumers are assumed to face sufficiently severe free-riding 
problems to be unable to organize political action (see Olson, 1965).  The model defines 
a three-stage game between the government and the lobby. Both players are risk neutral. 
The timing assumptions are as follows:   
Stage 1. In stage one the lobby group offers the incumbent government a bribe 
schedule Λ(t). The lobby’s strategy hence consists of a continuous function 
ℜ→Λ Tt :)( , i.e., it offers a specific bribe for selecting a policy t. The lobby faces 
uncertainty on whether the incumbent government will remain in power long enough 
for the lobby to reap a reward to its bribe (policy implementation occurs only in stage 
three). In stage one, the lobby assigns a probability 10 << γ  that the government will 
remain in office, and a probability )1( γ−  that it will thrown out. Thus, γ  is a measure 
of the degree of political stability. All players also assign a probability 10 << λ  that the 
chosen policy is implemented by the new government, in the event the incumbent leaves 
office early.12 We make a simplifying assumption about this parameter. Assumption 1: 
The probability λ is small.13  
                                                 
11 This assumption simplifies the presentation of our theoretical results, but does not change them. 
12 Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) make an identical assumption. For example, the new government 
may have other policy priorities before the next election, the process of hiring new officials in charge of 
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Stage 2. In the second stage the incumbent government proceeds to set its optimal 
environmental policy, given the lobby group’s strategy. The government also collects 
the associated bribe from the producer lobby.14 Bribes are used for the incumbent 
politicians’ personal consumption during this stage.   
Stage 3. In the third stage, the selected policy is implemented, given that the 
incumbent government remains in power, or in the event that the successor keeps the 
policy selected by its predecessor. Producers determine output and abatement levels. 
Turnover could occur, for example, because of a vote of no confidence, or a coup 
attempt. From the lobby’s perspective in stage one, policy implementation occurs with a 
probability .)1( λγγ −+  This is the probability that all policy-favors “purchased” by the 
lobby will be delivered. With a probability )1)(1( λγ −−  the incumbent is removed 
from office and the policy is not implemented.15 For simplicity, the game between the 
lobby and the incumbent simply ends here in this event. Since the challenger did not 
receive a bribe within the period, it is not committed to its predecessor’s policy 
promises, although it may choose to implement its predecessor’s policy choice. In the 
event the challenger decides to change the predecessor’s environmental policy in stage 
three, the new government is assumed to set an exogenous tax tc, until a new lobbying 
game starts between itself and the lobby. 
The lobby takes the political stability level into account in its formulation of its 
bribe schedule. The gross (indirect) utility of the lobby group is therefore given by the 
expected value of specific factor income, 
 
(3)   ),1)(1)((])1()[()],([ λγπλγγπτ −−+−+≡Ω cF pptE    
     
where E[.] is the expectations operator and )( pπ  is aggregate factor income. This 
factor income is received in the event that the policy determined by the incumbent 
materializes. Since ,0=f  the lobby ignores tax and tariff revenues, as well as 
consumer surplus (it receives a negligible share).  If the incumbent government is 
                                                                                                                                               
carrying out environmental policy and the process of agenda setting may involve delays, or the 
government may want to avoid that environmental policy becomes an election issue. Thus, we view the 
new government as having an objective function identical to the incumbent, but due to some exogenous 
circumstance it may delay the taking of bribes in return for environmental policy choices.   
13 This assumption implicitly implies that the new government must care sufficiently about receiving a 
bribe in return for setting environmental policy.  
14 Neither the lobby group, nor the government, is assumed to renege on their promises in the second or 
third stages. Since corrupt government politicians likely have a monopoly on selling policy favors, it 
appears plausible that they have a relatively great bargaining power, and are able to demand that a bribe 
must be paid before any industry friendly policy action is taken. Our timing assumption also sharpens the 
focus on the considerate resources that industry groups invest in political connections and bribery, which 
is supported by empirical evidence.  
15 We abstract from possible strategic choices by the lobby, and we do not model the bribery game 
between the lobby and the new government. While it would be preferable to include the new 
government’s actions into the model, we opt to keep it as simple as possible and thus focus on the 
incumbent government policy choice only. 
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removed and the successor chooses a different policy, the lobby’s exogenous factor 
income equals ),( cpπ  where  pc = pw(1+τ) - tcθ(A)-A.  
The incumbent government values bribes and aggregate social welfare. Bribes 
are used for personal consumption, and social welfare is of relevance because the 
incumbent is more likely to win future re-election, the greater is average welfare. 
However, aggregate welfare is assumed of value to the incumbent government only if it 
stays in office. The incumbent government’s policy choice influences its own welfare 
only if it stays in power, in which case aggregate social welfare is given by 
 
(4)   ),(),())1(()(),( pXstRpC+l+pt wA θττπτ −++≡Ω   
   
which expresses the sum of all individuals’ aggregate factor rewards, labor income, 
consumer surplus, tax and tariff revenues, take the consumers’ aggregate disutility from 
pollution. Note that taking the first-order condition of the expression for aggregate 
social welfare, (4), yields the second-best tax, ,)( 2* sXAXXpst tApp
w >−+= θθθτ  
where s is the first-best pigouvian tax (i.e., under free trade). Since the presence of a 
tariff stimulates output, the optimal tax exceeds the marginal disutility of pollution, s.  If 
the incumbent government loses power, it has no interest in aggregate social welfare, 
and from the incumbent government’s point of view it equals zero.  
The incumbent government thus has an objective function equal to  
 
(5)   ),,()()],([ τγτ thttIE AΩ+Λ≡      
  
a weighed sum of the bribe and the expected aggregate social welfare. The exogenous 
parameter h is the government’s weight on welfare relative to bribes, which in our view 
reflects the degree of government honesty (absence of corruption). In our model, the 
bribe aims to influence government policy and not elections (see also Schulze and 
Ursprung,  2001; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003). López and Mitra (2000) employ a 
similar formulation in their investigation of the effect of corruption on the relationship 
between income and environmental quality. The government trades off the size of the 
bribe (which it enjoys with probability 1) with the expected value of aggregate social 
welfare.  
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the well-known model by Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) can be found using two necessary conditions: 
 
 (i)    ),()(maxarg τγ thtt A
t
Ω+Λ= °°  on Τ ; 
 (ii)    )],()([)](),([maxarg τγτ thtttt AF
t
Ω+Λ+Λ−Ω= °°°  on Τ .  
 
The equilibrium pollution tax policy °t  simultaneously maximizes the 
government’s utility function [condition (i)] and the joint utility of the lobby and the 
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incumbent [condition (ii)], given the turnover probability. The equilibrium 
characterization is found by taking the first-order conditions of (i) and (ii), which yields 
 
(6)   ,0),()( =Ω+Λ °°° τγ tht Att   
      
and  
 
(7)   .0)],()([)](),([ =Ω+Λ+Λ−Ω °°°°°° τγτ thttt Attt
F
t    
   
Substituting (6) into (7) yields ),(),( °°° Λ=Ω tt t
F
t τ  which reflects the fact that the bribe 
schedule is locally truthful, as discussed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). The 
characterization of the equilibrium pollution tax is found by substituting this condition 
into (6), which yields  
 
(8)  .0),(),( =Ω+Ω °° τγτ tht At
F
t       
   
Differentiation of equations (3) and (4) with respect to the pollution tax yields 
 
(9)  ),)1((),( λγγθτ −+−=Ω XtFt   
     
and  
 




t XpXXAstt +−−=Ω    
  
Substituting expressions (9) and (10) into equation (8), and rearranging, we find an 
explicit expression for the equilibrium characterization given by  
 






XpXXAsthX θτθθγλγγθ   
   
Note that the second term in (11) is adjusted by γ , rather than ),)1(( λγγ −+  
since the incumbent government does not benefit from its policy choice in the event it 
leaves office.  Note also that the equilibrium tax rate t  is smaller than the second-best 
tax, which the government would choose in the absence of instability and lobbying. 
Since term A in (11) is negative, term B is positive, which holds only if 
).( 2 XAXXpst tApp
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2. Trade Integration and Political Stability 
 
We now analyze the effects of trade integration on environmental policymaking, 
accounting for political stability. Note that “trade integration” in our analysis is 
identical to a cut in the tariff rate. The aim is to derive testable hypotheses for our 
empirical work carried out in the subsequent sections. We find the following 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 1: (i) In equilibrium, trade integration unambiguously causes the pollution 
tax rate to rise when (a) the degree of government honesty is low, or (b) 
θθ >− tA Ats )( ; (ii) The effect is conditional on the degree of political stability. For 
sufficiently low government honesty, the effect is increasing in political stability. 
 














∂    
  
where ,])1([2 γψλγγθ hXD p +−+=  and where +−≡ ){(
2
ptA XXA θθψ   
)}.]3)()[( 2 tAp
w
ptAttAtAA AXpXAAAXst θτθθθθ +−+−  D  is the second-order 
condition of the government’s maximization (8), which is required to be negative for a 
maximum. We assume this to be the case, which requires .0<ψ  The denominator of 
(12) is consequently negative. In the numerator, term A is positive, whereas term B is 
ambiguous in sign. We have two cases: (a) Term B is positive. For sufficiently low 
values of honesty, h, (equivalent to sufficiently high corruption), such that 
}])[({])1([ θθγλγγθ +−−+< tA Asth , the numerator is positive and thus expression 
(12) is negative. Trade integration leads to an increase in the pollution tax if 
government honesty is sufficiently low. (b) Term B is negative. In this case, (12) is 
unambiguously negative for all values of h. Thus, trade integration leads to an increase 
in the pollution tax.  
(ii) Differentiation of (12) yields 
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The sign of (13) is indeterminate. We seek to evaluate the sign of (13), focusing on 
parts I and II separately (one at a time). The focus is on the role of h and cases where 
(13) is negative. Part I: (a) If term A in the numerator is negative, term B is 
unambiguously positive for all values of h. (b) If term A is positive, term B in the 
numerator is positive for sufficiently low honesty, such that 
[ ]θθλθ +−−< tA Asth )(/)1( . Part II: Term C is positive (negative) for 
./)1()( 2 ψλθ −>< pXh  Term E is positive (negative) if 
[ ] [ ] ,)(/)1()( θθγλγγθ +−−+>< tA Asth  when [ ] .0)( >+− θθ tA Ast  Term E is 
unambiguously positive when [ ] .0)( <+− θθ tA Ast  Term F is positive if sign (term C) 
= sign (term E).   
Expression (13) shows how the effect of trade openness on the pollution tax 
)/( τ∂∂t is affected by a change in political stability, .γ  For sufficiently low honesty h, 
terms B, C, and E are positive, yielding a negative sign of (13). In this case (see part (i) 
of the proposition), greater political stability raises the effect of trade integration on the 
pollution tax. However, (13) is negative also with a high h and [ ] ,0)( >+− θθ tA Ast  
such that terms C and E are negative and thus F is positive.  In this case, if part II 
dominates part I in absolute value, or when part I is negative, (13) is negative.  
In sum, for sufficiently low h, ,0)/(2 <∂∂∂ γτt  such that the effect of trade 
integration on the pollution tax is increasing with political stability. For other values of 
h, we know only that ,0)/(2 ≠∂∂∂ γτt  i.e. the effect of trade integration on the 
pollution tax is conditional on political stability.  ■ 
The intuition is the following.16 (i) In this model, trade integration (a cut in the 
tariff rate) has two effects on environmental policy, and their size both depend on the 
degree of political stability. Term A in the numerator of (12) represents the reduction in 
the producers’ incentive to seek a lower pollution tax as a result of trade integration 
                                                 
16 The result is independent of environmental policy instrument used. With an emissions standard, trade 
integration would still result in a “bribery reduction effect” and a “welfare effect”. Revenues do not drive 
our result. Note that an identical result is obtained if the trade policy used is an export subsidy.  
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(note from (9) that term A is the second derivative )FtτΩ . When output shrinks, less is at 
stake for the lobby in the political process. Thus, the bribe offer is reduced, and the 
pollution tax rises through this channel.  We denote this the “bribery reduction effect” 
of trade integration.  
 Term B in the numerator of (12) reflects the change in the government’s 
incentive to tax pollution for welfare reasons (note from (10) that term B is the second 
derivative )AtτΩ . As discussed above, the tariff introduces distortions in production and 
consumption, and increases the aggregate level of pollution damage. In this small open 
economy, only one policy instrument is available to address these distortions: the 
pollution tax. As discussed above, the second-best pollution tax therefore exceeds 
marginal damage, i.e. .* st >  Trade integration reduces the marginal incentive to tax 
pollution for this reason. However, the net effect on the pollution tax is ambiguous, 
because of taxpayers’ interest in tax revenues and the effect on profits. We denote this 
the “welfare effect” of trade integration.17 If term B in (12) positive, the relative 
importance of the two effects (represented by terms A and B in (12), respectively) 
depends on the degree of honesty, h. In particular, when the degree of government 
honesty is low (corruption is high) such that [ ]{ } /)1( λγγθ −+<h  [ ]{ }θθγ +− tA Ast )( , 
the bribery reduction effect dominates the welfare effect and trade integration raises the 
pollution tax. If term B is negative, trade integration unambiguously raises the pollution 
tax.  
(ii) The two effects discussed above are adjusted for the probability of 
successful eventual policy implementation, reflected by the level of political stability, 
.γ  Bribery and social welfare are important (to the lobby and the government, 
respectively) only as long as the government stays in power long enough to deliver and 
reap the benefit of its policy choice. In addition, the lobby also benefits from bribery to 
the extent that a new government would implement the policy paid for (without extra 
cost), which occurs with probability .)1( λγ−   
Changes in γ  affect τ∂∂ /t  both via its impact on the “bribery reduction 
effect” and  on the “welfare effect”. For low government honesty, h, terms B, C, and D 
in (13) are all positive, and thus (13) is negative. In this case, the effect of γ  occurs via 
the “bribery reduction effect”, since welfare in this case is of minor importance. The 
main effect is here that political stability raises the lobby’s incentive to offer a sizeable 
bribe. Changes in this incentive due to trade integration are therefore more pronounced 
with greater political stability.  
For high levels of honesty, all terms in (13) have ambiguous sign, and the 
relative impact of political stability on the (i) bribery reduction effect and (ii) the 
welfare effect determines the sign of )./(2 γτ∂∂∂ t  Greater political stability implies 
                                                 
17 Note that since trade integration shrinks the pollution intensive sector, environmental damage falls, 
given the pollution tax. A falling pollution tax would therefore not necessarily be welfare-reducing. Our 
focus is on the determination of the pollution tax, however, and we abstract from welfare issues in this 
paper. 
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that social welfare is of greater concern to the incumbent government. As discussed 
above, trade integration lowers the incentive to tax pollution for second-best welfare 
reasons, and this incentive-reducing effect is relatively stronger where political stability 
is high. 
 
3. Empirical Specification and Data 
 
The theoretical model developed in the previous sections yields testable 
implications of the relationships between trade openness (trade integration), political 
stability, and environmental policy formation, expressed in Proposition 1. Our objective 
is to test these implications using cross-country data on environmental policy. 
Proposition 1 shows that for low levels of government honesty, trade integration raises 
environmental policy stringency, and this effect is stronger the greater the degree of 
political stability. However, the same outcome may occur also for high levels of 
honesty, and our empirical work will also seek to determine the sensitivity of our results 
to the level of government honesty. 
The empirical estimation can be formulated as follows, 
 
(14)  ti  = x′ iβx + βγγi + βτ 1−iτ  + β
γτ γi 1−iτ  + βhhi + εi,  
   
where ti is the stringency of environmental policy in country i, xi is a vector of controls, 
γi is the degree of political stability, 1−iτ   is the degree of trade openness (the inverted 
tariff rate), hi is government honesty (absence of corruption), and εi is a zero mean error 
term. Whereas βγ, βτ , βγτ and βh are coefficient scalars, βx is a coefficient vector.   
We now describe the variables used to test the prediction generated by our theory. 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression. Table 
A.1 in the Appendix contains a further description of the data and sources.  
Our measure of the stringency of environmental regulations is a sub-index from the 
2001 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) developed by CIESIN (2001).  We 
employ one of the core indicators as our measure of the stringency of environmental 
policies for 2000, which we denote Environmental Stringency. This is an aggregation 
of various indicators consisting of regulation and management, private sector 
responsiveness, science and technology, capacity for debate, environmental 
information, and eco-efficiency. It captures the extent to which the country has in place 
institutions and policies that result in effective responses to environmental problems 
(i.e., laws on the book, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement).  It takes values 
between 0 and 100, where a higher value implies greater environmental policy 
stringency.18  
                                                 
18 To our knowledge, our dependent variable is the best measure of environmental policy stringency 
available for a large number of countries during the time period studied. 
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Table 1.A. Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample  





Environmental Stringency 118 46.94 18.38 18.1 92.3 
Log (GDP) 114 8.37 1.09 6.2 10.3 
Openness 113 2.78 1.19 1.0 5.0 
Dishonesty 77 5.32 2.35 0.0 8.3 
Honesty 113 0.02 0.91 -1.6 2.1 
Political Stability 113 0.06 0.82 -2.4 1.7 
% Non-Ag Labor 117 63.06 27.57 5.9 98.8 
Economic Freedom 99 6.60 1.41 3.7 9.1 
Democracy 86 0.23 0.42 0.0 1.0 
Federal 86 0.20 0.40 0.0 1.0 
War Dummy 98 0.30 0.46 0.0 1.0 
Civil War Dummy 98 0.27 0.44 0.0 1.0 
Common Law 86 0.29 0.46 0.0 1.0 
Racial Tension 87 3.72 1.62 0.0 6.0 
Ethno-religious  
Fractionalization 
97 0.44 0.23 0.0 0.9 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
98 0.33 0.30 0.0 0.9 
Civic Freedom 118 3.51 1.64 1.0 7.0 
Dismag 77 0.55 0.39 0.0 1.0 
 
Table 1.B. Descriptive Statistics: Developing Country Sample 





Environmental Stringency 92 39.63 10.98 18.1 72.9 
Log (GDP) 88 7.96 0.85 6.2 9.8 
Openness 87 2.43 1.13 1.0 5.0 
Dishonesty 51 6.53 1.27 2.7 8.3 
Honesty 87 -0.35 0.55 -1.6 1.3 
Political Stability 87 -0.21 0.67 -2.4 1.1 
% Non-Ag Labor 92 56.38 26.91 5.9 98.8 
Economic Freedom 73 6.10 1.25 3.7 8.4 
Democracy 60 0.05 0.22 0.0 1.0 
Federal 60 0.13 0.34 0.0 1.0 
War Dummy 72 0.38 0.49 0.0 1.0 
Civil War Dummy 72 0.33 0.47 0.0 1.0 
Common Law 60 0.33 0.48 0.0 1.0 
Racial Tension 61 3.25 1.51 0.0 6.0 
Ethno-religious 
Fractionalization 
71 0.49 0.22 0.0 0.9 
Ethno-linguistic 
Fractionalization 
72 0.40 0.31 0.0 0.9 
Civic Freedom 92 4.01 1.43 2.0 7.0 
Dismag 51 0.53 0.40 0.0 1.0 
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Political stability is not directly observable. However, a measure of political 
stability has been developed by Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b) for the years 1997-98.  
The Political Stability index combines several indicators seeking to measure 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or 
overthrown. It takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher value represents greater 
political stability. We also use Racial Tension as an alternate measure of political (in-
)stability (Knack and Keefer, 1995). It is an index for countries experiencing racial 
tension and takes values from 1 (high tension) to 6 (low tension).  
Our trade openness measure is an index developed by the Heritage Foundation 
and the Wall Street Journal (O'Driscoll et al., 2000) (Openness).  An economy earns a 
5 if it has an average tariff rate of ≤4% and/or has very few non-tariff barriers, and a 1 if 
the average tariff rate is >19% and/or there are very high non-tariff barriers that 
virtually prohibit imports. Thus, we expect that Openness will take a positive sign. We 
also use a more comprehensive (general) measure of economic liberalization and 
openness, the Economic Freedom index, compiled by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et 
al., 2000).  The Economic Freedom index is a composite index of ten individual 
indices for 1997.  It takes values between 0 and 10, where a higher value for the index 
indicates a greater degree of economic liberalization and freedom.  
A main implication of our theory is that the effect of trade integration is 
conditional on the degree of political stability. We therefore include the relevant 
interaction variables Openness×Political Stability and Economic Freedom×Political 
Stability.  
We have two proxies for government honesty. One is an index developed by 
Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b), Honesty.19  It measures perceptions of honesty in 
government in a country, or more precisely, the absence of the use of public power for 
private gain. The index takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher value implies 
more honesty, and thus we expect a positive sign. Our second government honesty 
measure is the Corruption Perceptions Index (Dishonesty) developed by Transparency 
International, which measures the “perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by 
business people, risk analysts, and the general public.”  The index is computed as the 
sample average of a number of different surveys assessing each country’s performance. 
Dishonesty ranges between 0 (perfectly clean) and 10 (highly corrupt).20 We expect a 
negative sign.  
Proposition 1 suggests that the level of government honesty may play a role for 
the effect of openness on environmental policy, and the interaction effect with -political 
stability. To investigate the impact of government honesty on the relationships of 
interest, we therefore experiment with different cut-off values for Honesty.  
                                                 
19 The indicator reflects the statistical compilation of perceptions of the quality of governance of a large 
number of survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as well as non-governmental 
organizations, commercial risk rating agencies, and think tanks during 1997 and 1998. 
20 The index is inverted in the scale from the original data by subtracting values from 10 to make results 
more intuitive. A number of recent empirical studies of corruption have employed this index, including 
Persson et al. (2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Fredriksson et al. (2004). 
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Given the possible endogeneity of the Honesty, Political Stability, and 
Openness variables, OLS is expected to lead to biased results. We therefore test for the 
necessity of an instrumental variable approach (whether the set of estimates obtained by 
least squares are consistent or not) by using an augmented regression test (the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test) (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). This is carried out by including 
the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side variable as a function of all exogenous 
variables in a regression of the original model.21 A smaller p-value for Honesty and 
Political Stability in our model indicates that they are endogenous and that OLS is 
inconsistent.  However, trade openness was found to be exogenous and hence can be 
treated as predetermined. We correct for the endogeneity of corruption and political 
stability by using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS).  We also test for possible 
heteroskedasticity and correct it using White’s correction.22  
Our theoretical model, as well as the previous empirical literature (see, for 
example, Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003), is informative concerning control variables 
to include in regression (14).  Two sets of controls capture demand factors and 
structural features of an economy that may influence environmental policy in alternative 
ways that are not the focus of the present paper. We thus include the log of purchasing 
power adjusted per capita GDP, Log GDP.   
Industrial environmental policies are also influenced by the workers employed 
in polluting sectors. The greater their stake in the policy outcome, the greater their 
political pressure and success.  However, Olson’s (1965) theory of free-riding implies 
that political influence may decline as the size of an interest group increases. We use the 
proportion of the total labor force working in non-agricultural sectors (% Non-Ag. 
Labor) as our measure of worker political pressure on industry environmental policies.  
The labor force here comprises all individuals who meet the International Labor 
Organization’s definition of the economically active population. The expected sign is 
indeterminate. The remaining control variable seeks to adjust for structural differences 
between countries.23  
Given the endogeneity of Honesty, Dishonesty and Political Stability, we use a 
number of instrumental variables to test and correct for the bias.  For example, La Porta 
et al. (1999), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Persson et al. (2003) discuss factors 
determining corruption. We model the determinants of government honesty into two 
main categories, namely standard economic controls, and political and legal history.  
Based on the literature, we selected the following instruments: a dummy for common 
law system (Legal Origin) from La Porta et al. (1999) (also used by Fredriksson and 
Svensson, 2003), an indicator of the federal nature of government (Federation) (see 
Fisman and Gatti, 2002), and a variable measuring electoral district magnitudes 
                                                 
21 This is an augmented form of the Hausman test for contemporaneous correlation between the error term 
and the regressors, used to test exogeneity of variables (Hausman, 1983).   
22 See White (1980) and Greene (1997) for White’s correction to standard errors for an unknown form of 
heteroskedasticity. 
23 We do not include a measure of the marginal damage from pollution since this will be determined by 
environmental policy.  
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(Dismag). Dismag comes from Persson et al. (2003) who argue that electoral 
competition becomes stiffer in countries with single-member districts than in countries 
with a single nation-wide district. As a result, candidates become more focused and 
disciplined and hence demonstrate less rent seeking behavior and more honesty.  
We hypothesize that political stability is to a large extent a function of the 
prevailing economic, political and social factors. We use Racial Tension, Ethno-
religious Fractionalization, dummies for countries with recent history of War and 
Civil War as our instruments for Political Stability.  The test of over-identifying 
restrictions was applied to the various sets of instruments. It indicates that our 
instruments are valid.24 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
We empirically test our model for a sample of 118 countries for which the 
Environmental Stringency variable is available, of which 92 are non-OECD countries.  
Table 2 presents the first-stage regressions for Dishonesty, Honesty, and Political 
Stability, identifying various instruments. They are able to explain a large portion of 
the variation in Dishonesty, Honesty, and Political Stability. A number of instruments 
are significant at conventional levels, in addition to the level of income (Log GDP). 
Dishonesty is driven by the degree of decentralized structure of government (Federal 
Dummy), consistent with the literature suggesting that a federal structural of 
government adds further layers of bureaucracy and increases rent seeking opportunities. 
The existence of common law system (Legal Origin) appears to reduce Dishonesty 
levels, consistent with earlier research findings which suggest that ‘civil law’ countries 
with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less fairness in 
judicial decisions and more corruption compared with ‘common law’ countries (see 
Djankov et al., 2002).25 The Honesty equation suggests that curtailing basic civic rights 
may reduce government honesty by vesting power in a few hands. 
Political Stability appears to be associated primarily with low levels of ethno-
religious fractionalization and racial tension, and higher levels of economic 
development. This is consistent with the literature which argues that that ethnic and 
religious fractionalization proxies for the degree of conflict in society, which fuels 
political instability (see Annet, 2001).  
The estimation results for the Environmental Stringency equation for the full 
sample are presented in Table 3. The models contain estimates from both OLS and 
2SLS regressions using different controls. The OLS results are presented for 
comparison. The results suggest that the point estimates for our key variables such as 
Openness and Political Stability are more robust and significant at higher levels when  
 
                                                 
24 The order condition necessary for identification is satisfied since the Dishonesty, Honesty and 
Political Stability equations are over-identified.    
25 La Porta et al. (1999) and Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) have previously found that legal origin is a 
good instrument for the degree of corruption. 
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Table 2: First Stage Regressions  
Variable 
 
Dishonesty Honesty Political 
Stability 






War Dummy   -0.17 
(1.3) 




  0.74 
(2.8)*** 






































R2 0.716 0.750 0.585 
Observations 77 79 87 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *(**) [***] statistically significant at the 10 (5) [1] 
percent level.  
 
the endogeneity is taken into account.26 The results support our theory and the estimates 
appear robust under alternate specifications.  Moreover, all variables that are 
statistically significant have the expected sign. 
 The Openness and Economic Freedom variables are significant across most 
models, indicating that countries with more liberal trade policies, which are more 
economically integrated with the rest of the world, tend to set more stringent 
environmental policies. First, protection tends to worsen pollution because it stimulates 
output. Tariff reduction (Openness) by itself reduces output and pollution, which makes 
                                                 
26 As Table 2 reveals, we are able to explain a large portion of the variation in Dishonesty and Political 
Stability in our first stage regressions.  
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it less profitable to bribe the government to reduce stringency. Thus, the “bribery 
reduction effect” of trade openness is to make environmental policy more stringent. In 
the opposite direction, because openness reduces the need for domestic production of 
the polluting good, the “welfare effect” means a lower need for stringent environmental 
policy. The empirical finding is that liberal trade policies lead to more stringent 
environmental policies. This indicates that the bribery reduction effect of trade 
integration dominates the welfare effect.  
To gain an understanding of the full effect of trade openness on environmental 
policy, we need to consider the interaction effect identified by our theory. The 
interaction variables Openness×Political Stability and Economic Freedom×Political  
 
Table 3: Environmental Stringency Regressions (OLS and 2SLS) 
Variable OLS 2SLS 

























Honesty  12.75 
(7.8)***
    8.86 
(2.2)** 




























  2.95 
(3.2)*** 

















Racial Tension    -3.83 
(2.7)***













  2.68 
(2.5)** 





   1.23 
(2.8)***















R2 0.870 0.853 0.879 0.884 0.818 0.856 0.816 
Observations 76 107 74 69 68 68 68 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *(**) [***] statistically significant at the 10 (5) [1] 
percent level.  
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Stability are positive and significant in all models. Thus, the effect of Openness is 
conditional on the level of Political Stability. As the degree of trade integration rises, 
so does the stringency of environmental policy, and this is particularly true in 
politically stable countries. The reduction of industry bribery as a result of trade 
integration is particularly strong when influence-seeking and bribery takes place under 
predictable (stable) political conditions. Using Racial Tension as a proxy for political 
(in-)stability in the fourth column, our results largely continue to hold.  
Openness×Racial Tension is significant, although Openness becomes insignificant 
when this interaction term is included.  
To see the complete effect of Political Stability, we also need to consider its 
interactions. For example, using the estimates from the 5th model (5th column) of Table 
3 (2SLS), we find that ∂Environmental Stringency/∂Political Stability = 2.53 (= -
20.77 + 8.38×2.78) (evaluated at the mean of Openness). That is, political stability is 
 
Table 4: Environmental Stringency Regressions: Developing Countries 
Variable OLS 2SLS 





































Economic Freedom  3.52 
(3.2)*** 
  4.08 
(2.9)*** 

















  6.73 
(2.5)** 
 
Economic Freedom×  
Political Stability  
 2.49 
(2.0)* 

















R2 0.761 0.781 0.817 0.738 0.733 
Observations 52 50 46 45 45 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *(**) [***] statistically significant at the 10 (5) [1] 
percent level.  
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associated with greater environmental policy stringency, except in relatively closed 
economies (where the total marginal effect turns negative).   
Turning to our control variables, Dishonesty and Honesty are significant across 
the models with the expected signs, suggesting that lower levels of corruption are 
associated with stricter environmental policies. Log GDP is significant in only some of 
the OLS regressions, as is % Non-Ag. Labor.27 This may suggest that the variables of 
main interest are relatively important determinants of environmental policy.28 
Table 4 replicates Table 3 using only the developing country observations. 
Policy advice may have particular relevance for this group of countries. In addition, this 
group of countries has a lower average of Honesty, and these regressions may 
consequently shed some light on the role of the honesty variable for the direction of the 
interaction in focus (see the discussion in connection with Proposition 1). We find that 
Openness and Economic Freedom are associated with more stringent environmental 
policies in developing countries, and again this is particularly the case where political  
 
Table 5: Environmental Stringency Regressions: Varying Corruption Levels 
 OLS 2SLS 
Sample Range 
Dishonesty Index 
5-10 4-10 2-10 5-10 4-10 2-10 






















































































R2 0.526 0.591 0.742 0.561 0.585 0.721 
Observations 50 58 65 42 49 56 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. *(**) [***] statistically significant at the 10 (5) [1] 
percent level.  
                                                 
27 To adjust for structural differences between countries, we also tried including an OECD country 
dummy. This was insignificant in all regressions. 
28 This can also be interpreted that the traditional Kuznets type results may not hold when structural 
variables such as dishonesty and political stability are controlled for. This is a topic for future research. 
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stability is high.  The only difference between Tables 3 and 4 appear to be that 
Dishonesty is insignificant in both 2SLS models, possibly due to insufficient variation. 
To further explore the impact of honesty for our main results, we performed a 
sensitivity analysis for our regressions of main interest. The samples used in Table 5 are 
determined by the countries’ Dishonesty scores. We used three different cut-off levels 
of Dishonesty (i) 5-10; (ii) 4-10; (iii) 2-10, where the first sample contains only the 
most dishonest countries. Table 5 reveals that our main results appear quite insensitive 
to the Dishonesty scores. Openness and its interaction with Political Stability remain 
significant and positive in all models. Dishonesty is here significant only in the largest 
samples (including countries with Dishonesty index 2-10).  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper develops a theory of how environmental policy formation is affected 
by the degree of economic integration and the level of political turbulence. The 
prediction that emerges is that trade integration is associated with stricter environmental 
policies in countries with relatively corrupt governments, and this effect may occur also 
in less corrupt countries. Moreover, the theory predicts an interaction effect between the 
degree of trade integration and the level of political stability.  
These predictions are supported by our empirical findings from developed and 
developing countries. Trade integration leads to more stringent environmental policies, 
and the effect is greater in politically stable countries. Our findings suggest that 
predictions of environmental policy outcomes in connection to trade reform programs 
should take the degree of political stability into account.  
21Fredriksson and Mani: Integration, Political Turbulence and Environmental Policy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
References 
 
Alvarez, M., J.A. Cheibub, F. Limongi, and A. Przeworski, “Classifying political 
regimes,” Studies in Comparative International Development 31, 2-36 (1996). 
 
Antweiler, W., B.R. Copeland, and M.S. Taylor, “Is free trade good for the 
environment?” American Economic Review 91, 877-908 (2001). 
  
Annet, A., "Social fractionalization, political instability, and the size of government," 
IMF Staff Papers 48, 561-592 (2001).  
 
Bernheim, B.D. and M.D. Whinston, "Menu auctions, resource allocation, and 
economic influence," Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-31 (1986). 
 
Bohn, H. and R.T. Deacon, “Ownership risk, investment, and the use of natural 
resources,” American Economic Review 90, 526-549 (2000). 
 
Bommer, R. and G.G. Schulze, “Environmental improvement with trade liberalization,” 
European Journal of Political Economy 15, 639-661 (1999).  
 
Brett, C. and M. Keen, “Political uncertainty and earmarking of environmental taxes,” 
Journal of Public Economics 75, 315-340 (2000). 
 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), Global Leaders 
for Tomorrow, and Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, Columbia 
University, World Economic Forum, and Yale University, www.ciesin.org (2001). 
 
Coate, S. and S. Morris, “Policy persistence,” American Economic Review 89, 1327-
1336 (1999).  
 
Copeland, B.R., “International trade and the environment: policy reform in a polluted 
small open economy,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 26, 
44-65 (1994). 
 
--, “Pollution content tariffs, environmental rent shifting, and the control of cross-border 
pollution,” Journal of International Economics 40, 459-476 (1996). 
 
-- and M.S. Taylor, “North-South trade and the environment,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 109, 755-787 (1994). 
 
-- and --, “Trade and transboundary pollution,” American Economic Review 85, 716-737 
(1995). 
 
22 Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy Vol. 4 [2004], No. 2, Article 1
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss2/art1
Damania, R., “When the weak win: the role of investment in environmental lobbying,” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 42, 1-22 (2001). 
 
--, P.G. Fredriksson, and J.A. List, “Trade liberalization, corruption, and environmental 
policy formation: theory and evidence,” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 46, 490-512 (2003). 
  
Davidson, R. and J. G. MacKinnon, Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, New 
York: Oxford University Press (1993).  
 
Dean, J.M., “Does trade liberalization harm the environment: a new test,” Canadian 
Journal of Economics 35, 819-842 (2002).  
 
Djankov, S.D., R. La Porta, F.Lopez de Silanes and A. Shleifer, “Courts: the Lex Mundi 
project,” NBER Working Paper No. 8890, Cambridge, MA (2002). 
 
Ederington, J., “International coordination of trade and domestic policies,” American 
Economic Review 91, 1580-1593 (2000). 
 
Esty, D.C. and Geradin, D., “Environmental protection and international 
competitiveness,” Journal of World Trade 32, 5-46 (1998). 
 
Fisman, R. and Gatti, R., “Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries,” 
Journal of Public Economics 83, 325-345 (2002). 
 
Fredriksson, P.G., “The political economy of trade liberalization and environmental 
policy,” Southern Economic Journal 65, 513-525 (1999). 
 
-- and J. Svensson, “Political instability, corruption and policy formation: the case of 
environmental policy,” Journal of Public Economics 87, 1383-1405 (2003). 
 
--, H.R.J. Vollebergh and E. Dijkgraaf  “Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD 
countries: theory and evidence,” Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management (2004), forthcoming. 
 
Greene, W.H., Econometric Analysis, 3rd ed., Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall 
(2003). 
 
Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman, "Protection for sale," American Economic Review 84, 
833-850 (1994). 
 
Gwartney, J., R. Lawson, and D. Samida, Economic Freedom of the World 2000 Annual 
Report, Vancouver: The Fraser Institute (2000).   
23Fredriksson and Mani: Integration, Political Turbulence and Environmental Policy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
 
Hausman, J., “Specification and estimation of simultaneous equations models,” in Z. 
Griliches and M. Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Amsterdam: North-
Holland (1983). 
 
Hillman, A.L. and H.W. Ursprung, “Greens, supergreens, and international trade policy: 
environmental concerns and protectionism,” in C. Carraro, ed., The International 
Dimension of Environmental Policy, Dordrecht: Kluwer (1994).  
 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton, “Aggregating Governance Indicators,” 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2195, Washington, DC: The World Bank 
(1999a). 
 
--, -- and --, "Governance Matters," Policy Research Department Working Paper No. 
2196, Washington, DC: The World Bank (1999b). 
 
Knack, S. and P. Keefer, “Institutions and economic performance: cross-country tests 
using alternative institutional measures,” Economics and Politics 7, 207-227 (1995). 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, “The quality of 
government,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 222-279 (1999). 
 
López, R., “Environmental externalities in traditional agriculture and the impact of trade 
liberalization: the case of Ghana,” Journal of Development Economics 53, 17-39 
(1997). 
 
-- and S. Mitra, “Corruption, pollution and the Kuznets environment curve,” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 40, 137-150 (2000). 
 
O'Driscoll, Jr., G.P., K.R. Holmes, and M. Kirkpatrick, 2000 Index of Economic 
Freedom, The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal (2000). 
 
Olson, M., The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
(1965). 
 
Persson, T., G. Tabellini, and F. Trebbi, “Electoral rules and corruption,” Journal of the 
European Economic Association 1, 958-989 (2003). 
 
Rauscher, M., “On ecological dumping,” Oxford Economic Papers 46, 822-840 (1994).  
 
Rodrik, D., “Political uncertainty and private investment in developing countries,” 
Journal of Development Economics 36, 229-42 (1991). 
 
24 Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy Vol. 4 [2004], No. 2, Article 1
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss2/art1
Rose, A.K., “Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy?” Journal of 
International Economics (2004), forthcoming. 
 
Schulze, G. and H. Ursprung, “The political economy of international trade and the 
environment,” in G. Schulze and H. Ursprung, eds., International Environmental 
Economics: A Survey of the Issues, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001). 
 
Transparency International, www.transparency.de (1999). 
 
Wilson, J.D., “Capital mobility and environmental standards: is there a theoretical basis 
for a race to the bottom,” in J. Bhagwati and R.P Hudec, eds., Fair Trade and 
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade, Vol. 1, Cambridge and London: MIT 
Press (1996). 
 
White, H., “A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test 
for heteroscedasticity,” Econometrica 48, 817-838 (1980). 
 


























25Fredriksson and Mani: Integration, Political Turbulence and Environmental Policy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004
Appendix 
Table A.1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 




Captures the extent to which the country has in place institutions and policies that 
result in effective responses to environmental problems.  It takes values between 0 and 
100, where a higher value implies greater environmental policy stringency.  Source:  
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (2001), www.ciesin.org. 
GDP  GDP Per Capita (PPP) or Purchasing power adjusted GDP is obtained when GDP is 
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.  An 
international dollar thus has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar in 




Corruption Perceptions Index published by Transparency International, describes the 
level of perceived corruption in the public sector using a poll of political risk indexes.  
Original scores range from 0 (completely corrupt) to 10 (clean).  Average of CPI 
indexes for years 1997, 1998, and 1999.  The index is inverted in scale by subtracting 
values from 10 to make the results more intuitive.  Available at: www.transparency.de. 
Honesty Measures perceptions of honesty (absence of corruption) corruption in a country, or 
more precisely, the absence of the use of public power for private gain. The index 
takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher value implies greater control over 
corruption.  Source:  Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b). 
Political 
Stability 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be 
destabilized or overthrown. Takes values from –2.5 to 2.5, where a higher value 
represents greater political stability.  Source:  Kaufmann et al. (1999a, 1999b). 
Openness Index of trade openness developed by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street 
Journal.  Takes values from 1 to 5.  An economy earns a "5" if it has average tariff rate 
of less than or equal to 4 percentage points and/or has very few non-tariff barriers, and 
"1" if the average tariff rate is greater than 19% and/or there are very high non-tariff 
barriers that virtually prohibits imports.  Source: O'Driscoll et al. (2000). 
% Non-
Ag. Labor 
Proportion of the total labor force recorded as working in non-agricultural sectors.  
Source: World Development Indicators (2000). 
Economic 
Freedom 
Measure of economic liberalization and openness. A composite index of ten individual 
indices for 1997. Takes values between 0 and 10, where a higher value indicates a 
greater degree of economic liberalization and freedom. Source: Gwartney et al. (2000). 
Racial  
Tension 
Index for countries experiencing racial tension.  It takes values from 1 (high tension) to 
6 (low tension).  Source: Knack and Keefer (1995). 
Dismag A measure of the average number of representatives elected in each district taking 
values between 0 and 1. 0 represents a system with only single-member districts, 1 a 
system with a single electoral district. Persson et al. (2003). 
Federal  
Dummy 
Federal structure dummy variable. It takes the value 1 for federation, and 0 otherwise. 
Legal  
Origin 
Legal Origin Dummy taking the value 1 for countries with history of Anglo-Saxon 
Common Law, and 0 otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Civic  
Freedom 
Index that indicates the freedom enjoyed by the civil society.  Take a value from 1 
(most free) to 7 (least free).  Source:  Gwartney et al. (2000). 
War  
Dummy 
Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the country was involved in at least one 
incidence of war in the last 30 years, 0 otherwise. Source: Knack and Keefer (1995). 
Civil War 
Dummy 
Civil war dummy variable taking the value 1 if the country experienced civil war in the 
last 30 years, 0 otherwise. Source: Knack and Keefer (1995). 
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